Diplomacy is often defined as the art and practice of conducting negotiations and managing peaceful relationships between different countries or groups using communication, compromise, and mutual respect rather than force or conflict to solve problems. It is a discipline in which unrepresented nations and people -such as those cooperating with UNPO- must seek an active presence despite the difficulties not having an acknowledged international status implies. Since modern international politics took root in the late 19th and early 20th centuries, how often has statelessness allowed EU state-friendly majorities to annul their very presence in venues, events, debates and organisms of all descriptions? If in doubt, compare the rights enjoyed by EU citizens in monolingual nation-states with the discrimination suffered by stateless Catalans, Corsicans or Székelys! The states’ capacity for corporate exclusion is all-decisive.

In today’s article on diplomacy, with your permission I shall opt for a more self-critical and historical line to point to some of the shortcomings affecting the practice of international diplomacy over the centuries in the Catalan case. In this way I hope to paint a historical perspective that may permit insight into what changes would be necessary for future progress. Indeed, it may surprise readers to know that Catalan diplomacy has probably been more soundly applied in the distant past than it is now, despite the existence of multiple international bodies available for its practice today. Nonetheless, things were never easy for Catalonia, a young Pyrenean principality that gradually took shape after its effective emancipation from its original Carolingian mould and allegiance in the tenth century. Perhaps one of the most significant features of the first centuries of her existence, after forcing the Arabs southwards, was its confrontation with what was later to be France, a kingdom whose diplomatic alliance with the Vatican was often to lead to episodes as dramatic as the battle of Muret in 1213, where the Catalan-Aragonese King Pere I was to suffer defeat and death. Indeed, the following period of Catalan expansion in the Mediterranean was never free of diplomatic and military disputes with France, the Vatican and Genova although for many years the Catalan-Aragonese position was to be dominant. By the 15th Century though, the new threat came with the increasing pressure exerted by Castile. By the mid-seventeenth century, remembering former Carolingian ties, the Catalan Government -known as the Generalitat- after agreements with Cardinal Richelieu, actually made a valiant yet short-lived bid to break away from the Spanish crown and become a Republic under French protection.

Closer to modern times, Catalonia stood alone between the threatening and often concerted encroachment of Castile and France. The drift away from the brief 17th Century alliance with France placed the United Kingdom as a new diplomatic ally during the War of Spanish Succession (1705-1714). By signing the Pact of Genoa, in June 1705, the Catalans committed themselves to support the British in their bid to place Archiduke Charles of Austria on the Spanish throne in opposition to the Castilian candidate, French-born Bourbon Philip V. Yet Catalonia’s siding with Westminster and the Hapsburg cause -in a bid to conserve a more confederal monarchy and her national institutions- was to end up having tragic consequences for the Catalan cause. For the pact fell through when the early death of Charles’ elder brother left the Spanish throne free for Philip. At the subsequent Treaty of Utrecht (1713), the British goverment forsook the Pact of Genoa leaving Catalonia at the hooves of the Castilians and vengeful King Philip. Despite the fierce opposition his betrayal led to at Westminster, the fateful end result was the loss of Catalan self-rule and national institutions that were to become extinct until a timid recovery over two centuries later.

To speak of diplomatic activity exerted by the Catalans since that day is to speak of singular often private initiatives rather than concerted political moves.

The traditional lack of unity among Catalan political forces has all too often acted as a spanner in the works. One significant exception was to be the Paris trial of colonel Macià and other separatist leaders for their part in an armed uprising in 1926, along Irish Republican lines. The international support for Macià in his challenge against the Primo de Rivera dictatorship (1923-30) was to be notorious to the point that he was supported by important French ministers and appointed “personality of the month” in as prestigious a European publication as The London Illustrated News. He and his followers received a token sentence which must be interpreted as a major triumph for the Catalan cause, though admittedly it had resulted from judicial circumstances rather than a concerted line of diplomatic action as such.

One last mention regarding Catalan diplomatic activity must surely go to the attempts to join international diplomatic bodies after the end of World War I. One self-appointed Catalan National Committee addressed U.S. president Woodrow Wilson in an attempt to gain Catalonia admission at the Paris Peace Conference in January 1919. But this initiative failed to get the support even of the rickety Mancomunitat, the very first Catalan 4-province administrative body -with very limited powers- created since 1714. Wilson did not even answer the CNC’s request and Catalonia was predictably left out of the short-lived League of Nations. After World War II, attempts to join the embryo of the United Nations in San Francisco (1945) and the precedents of the European Union (EEC) at the 1948 The Hague convention (1948) were also ill-fated. They were often pursued by personal initiative and isolated groups of the day. The fact that the exiled Catalan government (headed by inexperienced and fundless president Josep Irla, the statutory substitute of Franco executed President Companys), was to have no part in these initiatives proves the failure of the Catalan political elite to assume an effective role in key diplomatic operations at crucial moments in history. In comparison, the Basque Government, presided over by President Aguirre, was to be much more diplomatically active and effective, albeit at a symbolic level.

This would lead us to the present day and a consideration of the role of Catalan diplomacy since the theoretical recovery of home rule and democracy after Franco’s death (a “recovery” that, needless to say, almost completely bars powers and competences in the area of international relations and diplomacy). Despite enormous limitations, one must admit that the twenty-three year presidency of Jordi Pujol (1980-2003) did visualize a more acceptable international presence of the Catalan nation, albeit symbolically, thanks largely to the strong personality and nationalist convictions Mr Pujol displayed. During his long period in office, his capacity for being received by world figures was to be a significant resource. But it was not until the birth of the independence Process (c 2010) that the political impulse to seek more meaningful international diplomatic relations took off both at a civic and governmetal level. As regards the role of civil society, we must mention the newly-created Catalan National Assembly (2012) and its operations creating committees abroad and seeking support of organizations worldwide. As regards the Catalan Government’s projects, the creation of DIPLOCAT -a mixed public-private consortium created in 2012 by the Catalan Government to promote the presence of Catalonia abroad- was also significant. Though often more culturally inclined than politically effective, it was to be a constant thorn in the side of the Spanish government that conducted a frenzied campaign to thwart its activities. Another important initiative by the Catalan government was the creation of new official Catalan delegations abroad, many of which did come close to what one may qualify as international diplomacy. Nevertheless, major mistakes were committed that harmed the cause. One such case was the tactless appointment of a pro-Russian delegate for the Baltic countries that in effect crippled the chances of support in what should have been a very receptive region.

As a conclusion to this article, we may say that Catalonia has a rather bumpy diplomatic track record. Though successful in breaking away from its early Carolingian allegiance and consolidating as one of Europe’s earliest and most influential Mediterranean parliamentary nations, its confrontation first with the Vatican and France, and later with Castile, meant that the conservation of its international status was to be progressively constricted. After a prosperous 14th and 15th Century period of supremacy in the Mediterranean, Catalonia was soon to lose diplomatic influence and power in the region. This was largely due to an uneven unification process with Castile in the late 15th century, a period of downstaging and increasing Castilian influence and domination. This process would later be dramatically aggravated first with a disastrous confrontation with Castile (1640-59) and finally with the complete loss of her national institutions in 1714. The recovery of an international diplomatic vocation would only be possible in the early years of the 20th Century. However, the lack of ambition and political unity often meant that initiatives got more shots in the foot than any form of practical support. Sincere moves towards a concerted diplomatic operation in favour of independence were all too often thwarted by more moderate initiatives when not by disruptive figures such as Jaume Duch, the current Catalan Government’s minister for the EU and Foreign Affairs. For years he was Director General of Communication at the European Parliament, a post from which he was to act as a constant lash against Catalan interests in Europe where State interests have tended to score increasingly higher than human rights and the right to self-determination of her citizens. Whatever the case, Catalonia -both her civil and governmental forces- will have to greatly improve her diplomatic prowess in the future. Two elements should prove useful here in that endeavour. Firstly, a fuller appreciation of the global implications embedded in Julian Assange’s famous February 2017 prophecy that the Catalan independence Process would create “a precedent of freedom or oppression in the western world”, a view that arguably -and sadly- has come true for all with eyes to see. And secondly, a progressively solid and more stable relationship between ANC (and other Catalan organizations) with international bodies such as UNPO that must serve to enhance Catalonia’s diplomacy record.

About the Author

Toni Strubell was born and brought up in England in an Anglo-Catalan Family. His mother’s side of the family were refugees forced to leave Catalonia in 1939 due to the victory of Franco’s fascist forces. Toni Strubell was educated in Oxford schools and University studying modern languages.

On returning to Catalonia, he worked for a time at Radio Olot but soon moved to the Basque Country where he taught languages and tourism at Donostia’s branch of the University of Deusto. As of 1996, he took an interest in the Historical Memory writing a book with credited historians Josep Maria Solé i Sabaté and Carles Llorens on FC Barcelona’s President Josep Sunyol, a victim of the fascists in 1936.

Strubell was a founder member of the Comissió de la Dignitat (Dignity Commission) in 2002, an entity that is still very active in the recovery of the Historical Memory and in denouncing and taking steps to curb the presence of the Francoist heritage in a country where there was no Nuremburg-type persecution of 40 years of fascist crimes. Strubell has written some 14 books and has been distinguished with the Saint George’s Cross, one of Catalonia’s highest official awards. He was elected MP for the 2010-2012 Catalan Parliament legistlature. His latest book is a novel on the 2017 Referendum and resulting repression called “La Darrera Paraula” ("The last word").